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Sarah Lawson'
INTRODUCTION
J ERI Stewart and Jimmy Randall had been dating for more than a year inMay of 2006 when their relationship became troubled. 2 On May 17, Jeri
went to her boyfriend's apartment and told him she did not want to date him
anymore. A confrontation ensued. Before Jeri could leave, Jimmy attacked her.
He pushed her onto the sofa and then onto the floor. He hit her in the face. He
tried to suffocate her several times, first with his hand and then with a balled
up sock that he forced into her mouth while he held her nose. Jeri struggled,
fighting back. She was able to break free and calm Jimmy down, only to be
attacked again. This second attack brought on screams loud enough to alert the
neighbors, who called the police. The officers arrived, restrained Jimmy, asked
questions, and completed the required investigation, but made no report or
arrest. They told Jeri to get an emergency protective order. She obtained the
order granting temporary protection. Following a hearing the court found that
Jeri was at risk for future abuse and issued a second, more permanent, domestic
violence order. But Jimmy appealed the order, and because Jeri did not live with
Jimmy, the order was reversed and Jeri's petition dismissed.Jeri was left without
protection from her abuser.'
Kentucky law should be changed to allow victims like Jeri to petition the
court for protection against their abusive partners. Currently, the law provides
comprehensive protections for victims of domestic violence.4 But the law limits
who may ask for protection. In Kentucky, only those who are married to, share
a child in common with, or live with their abuser may petition the court.' In
i J.D. expected May 2014, University of Kentucky College of Law. I would like to thank Pro-
fessor Franklin Runge and Carol Jordan for bringing this important Kentucky issue to my atten-
tion; Notes Editor Julie Rosing for her helpful comments that improved my Note a great deal; and
the Kentucky Law Journal for its hard work on this (and every) piece.
2 Randall v. Stewart, 223 S.W 3 d 2,122 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
3 Id. at 122-25.
4 The terms "domestic violence" and "intimate abuse" are used throughout this Note because
of their common usage in Kentucky's laws and in current debate surrounding the issue. However,
this author notes that these terms do not accurately represent the type of abuse they describe, as
will be explained in the following pages.
5 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (West 2006); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.720(I)-(2), (4) (West
Supp. 2012); Rivers v. Howell, 276 S.W.3 d 279, 281-82 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Barnett v. Wiley,
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essence, a victim like Jeri must move in with her abuser in order to ask the court
to be protected from abuse.'
Kentucky is one of few remaining states with such a restricted domestic
violence law.' Even then, many of the state statutes that extend protection to
members of dating relationships do so in a way that inaccurately reflects the
realities of this type of violence, thus failing to protect all victims of domestic
abuse. Against this backdrop, there have been several recent pushes in the
Kentucky legislature to expand the definition of who may petition the court for
protection from violence.' 'This Note analyzes the approaches of other states,
current theoretical understandings of domestic violence, and the recent debates
in Kentucky to conclude that such limited access to protection should change.
Part I explores the current state of domestic violence law across the country and
to whom it extends in each state. Part II identifies problems with existing laws
by examining theoretical explanations of domestic violence and its political
history. Part III proposes two amendments to Kentucky law and addresses
opponents' concerns.
I. CURRENT STATE LAWS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Kentucky
7This Part will initially examine the categories of victims who are protected
under Kentucky's current law. In order to gauge what is at stake once a victim
is able to ask the court for help, it is helpful to understand the assistance that is
103 S.W3d 17, 18 (Ky. 2003)). Additionally, the scope of this note is limited to victims of domestic
violence over the age of eighteen. However, the related case for more comprehensive protections of
teens subject to dating violence is compelling and serious. "According to community-based surveys,
more than half of adolescent girls who reported being sexually assaulted were assaulted while on
dates."Ky. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Ass'N, EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TEENS (2001), avail-
able at http://www.kdva.org/clearinghouse/factsheets/DV EffectsTeensFS.pdf.
6 About four in five victims of domestic violence are women. See SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S.
DEP'T JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2010, at I
(2oz), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv93ro.pdf. As such, this Note will use the fe-
male gender when referring to victims. However, men can also be victims of domestic violence.
In fact, around 2800 incidents of same-sex domestic violence were reported in 2003 in which the
victim was male. See Tara R. Pfeifer, Comment, Out ofthe Shadows: The Positive Impact ofLawrence
v. Texas on Victims ofSame-Sex Domestic Violence, 5o9 PENN ST. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2005) (discussing
the similar issues regarding same-sex domestic violence). This is indeed a serious problem, but is
beyond the scope of this Note.
7 The nine states that provide no protections to parties in dating relationships are Kentucky,
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. See infra
note 51.
8 See H.B. 9, 2o3 Gen. Assemb., z3 th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2013); H.B. 498, 2012 Gen. Assemb., I2th
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2012); H.B. 35, 20on Gen. Assemb., uth Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011). While this Note was
in its editing stages, another similar proposal, H.B. 8, was introduced in the House on January 7 th,
2014, and assigned to the Judiciary Committee. See H.B. 8, 2014 Gen. Assemb., 14 th Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2014).
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available to the victim. Therefore, this Part will also identify the four different
types of protective orders available to victims-the emergency protective order
and domestic violence order under the civil law, and the restraining order and
conditional release order under the criminal law.
1. Who May Petition the Court for Protection.-Kentucky passed its first law
specifically addressing domestic violence in 1984.9 Among its stated legislative
purposes was "[t]o allow persons who are victims of domestic violence and
abuse to obtain effective, short-term protection against further violence and
abuse." 0 This law established the legal framework still used today to combat
domestic violence. Supporters of the law saw these provisions as "additional
protections to victims" that would "address holes in the criminal code and also
provide additional legal support for victims of abuse."n Among these provisions
was the emergency protective order that, if granted by the court, would provide
immediate, temporary protection against abuse.12
However, only a "spouse, parent, child, stepchild or any other person
related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree"' was eligible to
petition the court for this protection order under the original 1984 law. This
has changed over time, but the definition is still limited. Today, "[a]ny family
member or member of an unmarried couple" may file a petition with the court
for protection from abuse.'4 Family members include spouses, former spouses,
children, grandparents, parents, stepchildren, or any other persons living in the
same household as the child if the child is the alleged victim." Unmarried
couples are defined as those who have a child in common or live together or
have lived together."
2. Kentucky's Civil Law: The Emergency Protective Order and Domestic Violence
Order.-Kentucky's civil domestic violence law, although imperfect, offers a
number of essential protections for victims. The first is immediate and easy
access. Any qualified party seeking protection from abuse can file a petition for
an emergency protective order (EPO) with the district court in the county in
9 Act of Mar. 28, 1984, ch. 152, 1984 Ky. Acts 389.
i0 Id.
n Carol E. Jordan & Karen Quinn, Kentucky Domestic Violence and Abuse Act: Civil Remedies
for Victims, Ky. BENCH & BAR, Winter 1998, at i, i (describing the new law as the "unique strength
of pairing civil protective orders and criminal prosecution means that victims can seek relief under
both systems to maximize protection").
12 Act of Mar. 28, 1984, ch. 52, sec. 6, 1984 Ky. Acts 389,390.
13 Act of Mar. 28, 1984, ch. 152, Sec. 2-3, 1984 Ky. Acts 389,389. Consanguinity is "the relation-
ship ofpersons ofthe same blood or origin."BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 344 (9 th ed. 2009). Affinity
is that relationship because of marriage. Id. at 67.
14 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.725(l) (West 2006).




which they reside." The court is required to allow twenty-four hour access" and
is prohibited from charging filing fees." The district judge will issue the EPO
if she determines that there is an "immediate and present danger of domestic
violence and abuse."20 If an EPO is issued, the "adverse party"must, among other
things, vacate the residence and make no contact with the victim.21 A great deal
of discretion is given to the judge in this determination, allowing her to "[e]nter
other orders the court believes will be of assistance in eliminating future acts of
domestic violence and abuse." 22 Violation of an EPO is a criminal offense,23 and
the order protects the petitioner until a hearing is held to determine whether
she is eligible for a domestic violence order (DVO).24
Second, Kentucky's civil system offers more permanent protection in the
form of the DVO. At the DVO hearing, both the petitioner and the adverse
party are given a chance to be heard under oath-the petitioner to explain
the reasons for her requests and the respondent to express any concerns. 25 If
the court "finds from a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of
domestic violence and abuse have occurred and may again occur," then the
court may issue a DVO.2 6 The DVO lasts up to three years and can be renewed
for another three years an unlimited number of times. 27
'Ihird, the civil law is constructed in a way that allows for tailored protection
for victims and harsh penalties for violations. The law gives the court discretion
to tailor the provisions of the order to the specific circumstances of each case,28
ensuring that each victim is protected to the greatest extent legally possible.
The DVO must be entered into the Law Information Network of Kentucky
(LINK).29 This computerized system gives police access from their cruisers to
updated information on the specific protections provided to each victim, based
on her individualized DVO.3 0 The party subject to a protective order (the party
found to be abusive) must surrender his license to carry a concealed deadly
17 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.725(l) (West 2006).
i8 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403-735(3)(a) (West 2oo6 & Supp. 2012).
19 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.730(3) (West 2oo6).
20 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.763(2), 403.760 (West 2oo6).
24 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760 (West 2oo6).
25 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.747 (West Supp. 2012).
26 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
27 Id.
28 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403-750(I)(j) (West Supp. 2012) ("[T]he court ... may ... enter other
orders the court believes will be of assistance in eliminating future acts of domestic violence and
abuse.").
29 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.770 (West 2oo6).
30 15 LOUISE GRAHAM & JAMES E. KELLER, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: DOMESTIc RELATIONS
LAW § 5:15 (3d ed. 2008).
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weapon."5 Also, he is prohibited from purchasing or attempting to purchase a
firearm under federal law.32 Violation of the DVO is a criminal offense.3
3. Protections for Victims Under Kentucky Criminal La.-he provisions of
Chapter 403 are, by far, the most comprehensive protections offered to victims
of domestic abuse in Kentucky.3 4 However, the criminal code establishes some
protections for victims (separate from the EPO and DVO) in the form of the
restraining order and the conditional release order.
Restraining orders are available through Kentucky's criminal stalking laws.36
A party is found guilty of stalking in the second degree when he "intentionally
. . . stalks another person; and . . . makes an explicit or implicit threat with
the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of . . . sexual contact ...
physical injury; or . . . death."" Stalking in the first degree is the same, with
the added requirement that the threat or stalking happens while the party is
subject to a protective order" or criminal complaint. 9 A conviction of stalking
31 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23 7.I1o(1 3 )(k) (West 2oo6).
32 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012) (barring persons who are subject to court protective orders from
possessing firearms); see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.095 (West 2006 & Supp. 20I2) (requiring
local law enforcement to notify protective order petitioners that party has purchased a firearm in
violation of federal law).
33 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403-763 (West 2006); see also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West
Supp. 2012) (describing a "substantial violation" as a violation of a protection order combined with
another crime that allows the court, in certain circumstances, to also require the violator to wear a
global positioning monitoring bracelet).
34 A restraining order (not necessarily related to domestic abuse) is also available under the
civil code, which may be awarded before or during a trial if "it clearly appeais from specific facts
shown by verified complaint or affidavit that the applicant's rights are being or will be violated
by the adverse party." Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.o3(i)(a). The procedures related to this order are sparse.
There is no evidence that the restraining order requires any of the safeguards that come with the
DVO. Most notably, the statute does not provide that a restraining order must be entered into the
LINK system. Therefore, even if it could be formulated to reflect specific protections for potential
victims of violence, there is no indication that police officers would have any knowledge of those
protections and would be limited in their authority to enforce them quickly. Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.03. In
recent years, the restraining order has mostly been used for injunctions to stop redistricting proce-
dures, Legislative Research Comm'n v. Fischer, 366 S.W.3d 905, 908-09 (Ky. 2012), false defamatory
speech, Hill v. Petrotech Resources Corp., 325 S.W.3 d 302, 313 (Ky. 2zoo), and preventing transfers
of assets, see Goldstein v. Feeley, 299 S.W.3d 549,551-55 (Ky. 2009). Not one of the cited cases refer-
enced use of this rule to prevent abusers from targeting the abused.
35 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.064 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (referring to this order as a
"protective order" or "order"). For clarity, the author has dubbed this order the "conditional release
order."
36 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.155 (West 2006). Kentucky's criminal stalking laws are codified
at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.130-.550 (West 2006).
37 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.150() (upper case format altered).
38 The statute does not specify any difference between an EPO and DVO, but it is assumed
that both are considered protective orders for the purpose of this statute. Thus, the existence of an
EPO or DVO increases the level of the crime, further illustrating its significance.
39 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.140 (West 2006).
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in the first or second degree serves as an automatic application for a restraining
order.40 The statute provides that the restraining order can restrict the adverse
party from entering certain places (residences, schools, etc.) or making contact
with the victim4' and the provisions of the order must be submitted to the
LINK system.42 Violation of the criminal restraining order carries criminal
sanctions.43 Unlike the EPO and DVO statutes, there is no provision in the
criminal law that allows the court to add "other" protections for the victim as
needed. Additionally, the criminal restraining order has a ten-year limit, with
no provision allowing for the possibility of renewal.4 Nor does the existence of
the restraining order alone ban the abusive party from purchasing or possessing
a firearm. 45
Conditional release orders are essentially protective orders that may be
attached as a condition of bail under Kentucky's criminal assault law. Since the
order accompanies a pretrial release, the provisions only apply after a party has
been arrested for an assault crime, sexual offense, or violation of an EPO, DVO,
or criminal restraining order.46 Consideration of whether conditions should be
attached to a release order are based on a recommendation report from the
pretrial services officer, who is required to interview the defendant, but not
the victim. 47 If the court, based on this report, finds that the defendant is a
"threat to the alleged victim" then it can impose conditions of bail restraining
the defendant from contacting the victim, entering certain areas, and using or
purchasing a firearm or alcohol. 48 The order must be entered into Kentucky's
LINK system49 and a violation of the order carries criminal sanctions.s0
40 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.155(i). Also, the party against whom the restraining order
is sought may request a hearing if they choose on the application of the restraining order Id. §
508.155(2).
41 Id. § 508.155(4).
42 Id. § 508.i55(8).
43 Id § 5o8.155(10) (violation is a class A misdemeanor).
44 Id § 508.155(5).
45 Id. § 508.155(6) (a party subject to a restraining order is only banned from purchasing a
firearm if he has previously been convicted of a felony).
46 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43i.o64 (West 20o6 & Supp. 2o12). Rather than a warrant (which
would lead to an arrest), the court may alternatively issue a summons "if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the defendant will appear in response." Ky. R. CRIM. P. 2.04(1).
47 See Ky. R. CalM. P 4 .o6.
48 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43i.o64 (West 2oo6 & Supp. 2012).
49 Id. § 431.064 (9).
50 Id. § 43.o64 (so).
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B. State Law-Extending Protection to Members ofDating Relationsbips
Kentucky is one of only nine states" that restrict their domestic violence
protections to married couples, couples that share a child, or those that
live together. Forty-one states extend protections to members of dating
relationships in some form.52 Interestingly, almost no state extends protection
to relationships like friendships or roommates. North Dakota is (potentially)
the exception, including within its definition of who may petition the court for
protection "any other person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing person
as determined by the court."" The North Dakota courts have not yet employed
this language to cover any particular victim, but it could broaden the scope of
who may ask for protection outside the bounds of "romantic" relationships.
The remaining state statutes employ a variety of terms and strategies to
describe what is meant by a "dating relationship" and who, exactly, is protected.5 4
The following categories explore these approaches in detail.
51 The other eight states that provide no protections to parties in dating relationships are
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.28(3) (West zoo) (requiring that petitioners live with abuser); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-13-1 (20zo) (requiring that petitioners currently or formerly lived with abuser); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 4-505(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (requiring that petitioners at least live with abuser);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29 19 .25 (F) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (requiring at least that petitioner has
cohabitated with abuser within five years of the abuse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-1o (Supp. 2ozz)
(requiring that petitioner and abuser live or have lived together); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-1(2)
(Supp. 2012) (requiring that petitioner and abuser live or formerly lived in the same household);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8B- 7-io2(2) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring that petitioner and abuser either
reside or have resided in the same residence); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Supp. 2012) (requiring
that petitioner and abuser either cohabit or have done so within one year).
52 See generally Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance
over Form in PersonalizedAbuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495 (2008) (examining different
state laws on dating relationships); Devon M. Largio, Note, Refining the Meaning andApplication of
"Dating Relationship" Language in Domestic Violence Statutes, 6o VAND. L. REV. 939 (2007) (catego-
rizing different state statutes on domestic violence law).
53 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(4) (2009).
54 One aspect of state statutes that has not been explored in this analysis is the focus on
gender in the definition of a dating relationship. Some states require the courts to consider the
"individuals involved in the relationship," MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21- 3 (d) (West Supp. 2012), while
others more explicitly require those individuals to be members of the opposite sex, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 5oB-i (20n1). This aspect of state domestic violence laws is outside the scope of this Note, but
is by no means any less serious of a problem. It is yet another obstacle that must be overcome in
the fight against domestic violence. See generally Tara R. Pfeifer, Comment, Out ofthe Shadows: The
Positive Impact ofLawrence v. Texas on Victims ofSame-Sex Domestic Violence, 1o9 PENN ST. L. REV.
1251 (2005) (discussing the similar issues regarding same-sex domestic violence).
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1. Intimate.-A number of states require a dating relationship to be an intimate
relationship." However, very few state legislatures have provided any more
specificity as to what is meant by intimacy.s6 Thus, courts are left to interpret
the meaning of the term.
Some courts have determined that intimacy exists by looking at a relationship
as it relates to third parties, requiring that it is "direct" (the two parties know
each other directly, rather than through a common third party),5 7 "exclusive,"
or "monogamous." 9 Courts have also described intimacy in terms of the depth
of the relationship, as an "emotional investment,"a or an "emotional bond."6'
Similarly, intimate relationships are described as those relationships in which
the parties are emotionally dependent on one another and have frequent, or
even daily, interaction.62
Whether intimacy means that the relationship must have a sexual
component varies widely from state to state. Three state statutes describe
intimacy as "primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional or
sexual involvement." 6  By contrast, other states do not explicitly require or
mention a "sexual" relationship. These statutes require intimacy"4 or describe
55 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(2) (2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6210 (West 2004) (characterized
by the expectation of affection); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3(2) (202); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
4 6:2i5i(B) (2010); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9 3 -21- 3(d) (West Supp. 2012); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(7)
(West Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § i73-B:i(XV) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-I3-2(A) (West 2053); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 4 59 -a(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 2013); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.oo2i(b) (West Supp. 2012);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8x3.12(I)(ag) (West Supp. 2012).
56 Only Michigan, Nebraska and Nevada elaborate on what is meant by "intimate associa-
tions." See infra note 63.
57 Mark W.v. Damion W, 887 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (Fam. Ct. 2009) ("For a relationship to be
'intimate' within the meaning of the statute, it must be direct, not one that is based upon multiple
degrees of separation or that exists only through a shared connection with a third party.").
58 People v. Disher, 224 P.3d 254, 259 (Colo. zoso) (en banc).
59 Shannon M. v. Michael C., 948 N.Y.S.2d 831, 839 (Fam. Ct. 2012) (holding that a relation-
ship established through an online dating website did not constitute an intimate relationship for
the purposes of the domestic violence statute).
6 0 Id.
61 Scott v. Shay, 928 A.2d 312,315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
62 Pennsylvania's Superior Court describes an intimate relationship as "functional interde-
pendence," in which "individuals interface in very practical areas of private life ... [such as] shared
involvement in the affairs of day-to-day living."Id.; see also Oriola v. Thaler, soo Cal. Rptr. 2d 822,
832-33 (Ct. App. 2000) ("[A] 'dating relationship' refers to serious courtship. It is a social relation-
ship between two individuals who have or have had a reciprocally amorous and increasingly exclu-
sive interest in one another, and shared expectation of the growth of that mutual interest, that has
endured for such a length of time and stimulated such frequent interactions that the relationship
cannot be deemed to have been casual.").
63 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 76 4 .i5a(b) (West Supp. 203); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-323(7)
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018(2) (2011).
64 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(2) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5Ixx(i)(I) (West 2012); N.Y.
Soc. SERv. LAW § 45 9-a(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 2013).
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a dating relationship as intimate or sexual, 65 thus implying that a non-sexual
relationship may still qualify as a dating relationship as long as it is found to be
an intimate one. When the statute is not specific, courts have also held that the
sexual relationship of the parties is not determinative of whether they are in an
"intimate relationship. "66
A small number of states also describe a dating relationship as an
engagement relationship. 7 Because this term is always used in addition to
"dating" or "intimacy" in the wording of the statute, it follows that no state
requires an individual be engaged in order to petition the court for protection.
'This term is most useful, however, in interpreting the intent of the respective
legislatures, as it most assuredly connotes a relationship that is similar to that
of marriage.
In her Note relating domestic violence law to teen dating, Devon M. Largio
argues that use of terms like "intimate" is not as helpful as other approaches in
defining dating relationships. 61 "When a statute merely provides a definition, it
is harder for a victim to fall into that specific category."6 ' Furthermore, Largio
points out that the use of a term like "engagement" is out of step with modern
day dating relationships.7
2. Romantic.-Some states also describe dating relationships as romantic
relationships.7 ' This term is often used in addition to other terms (the
relationship is romantic or intimate, romantic or sexual) to describe a dating
relationship. However, in a small number of states, a dating relationship is
defined as one that is romantic along with a list of factors that might indicate
such a relationship. 72
65 HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-1 (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § i 73-B:i(XV) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (West zoo).
66 People v. Disher, 224 P.3d 254, 259 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) ("An intimate relationship is not
synonymous with a sexual relationship. Intimate relationships can be sexual, but they need not be.").
67 CAL. PENAL CODE § I3 7 oo(b) (West 2012); HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-i (West 2008); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/n2A- 3 (3) (West Supp. 2013); MAsS. ANN. LAws ch. 2o9A, § i (LexisNexis
zon1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 6o.I() (West Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-2 9 -2(b) (Supp.
201).
68 Largio, supra note 52, at 962-64.
69 Id. at 964.
70 See id. at 967, 975.
71 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13- 36o(A)(6) (West Supp. 2012); HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-i (West
2oo8); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(2) (20u5); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21- 5 1mI(i)(r) (West 2012); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 5x8B.oi, subdiv. 2(b) (West Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5oB-i (2011); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. S, § 1101(2) (200); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.50.010(3) (2008).
72 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(2) (20n1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5m(i)(I) (West 2012); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 5 oB-i (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010(3)
(2008). These statutes describe "dating" as "romantic" and then provide additional factors for con-
sideration, implying that a relationship must be "romantic" and survive the factor balancing test.
However, Minnesota courts define "romantic" in terms of the factors themselves. Sperle v. Orth,
763 N.W2d 670, 674 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) ("[A] mere assertion that parties were once involved
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Like intimacy, no state statute or court explicitly defines what "romantic"
means. Certain cases hint at the meaning of "romantic relationship" by
identifying facts supporting the perceived "romantic" nature, such as couples
beginning to cohabitate shortly after their relationship begins." Since the term
"romantic" is often used interchangeably with "intimate" or "sexual," it follows
that a romantic relationship should be construed similarly.7 4
However, the term remains unclear. In order to be romantic, must the
relationship have a sexual component? How long must a couple with romantic
feelings toward one another have known each other? Does the term include
love at first sight? To complicate matters, some courts seem to require not
only that the relationship be romantic, but that it is "significant" as well.7 s
The American Heritage Dictionary defines romance as "ardent emotional
attachment or involvement between people; love; a strong, sometimes short-
lived attachment, fascination, or enthusiasm for something."" Similar to terms
like "intimate," whether a relationship is "romantic" varies from person to
person and judge to judge. Describing relationships in this way is not only
outdated," but it increases the potential that a victim who needs protection
cannot obtain it merely because her relationship does not fit the court's idea of
what is "romantic."7 8
3. Sexual-Often the description of what constitutes a dating relationship in
state statutes relates to sexuality.79 In some states, the statute appears to require
that a relationship be sexual in order to qualify as a dating relationship. 0 Even
if the state's statute does not require sex, the existence or frequency of sexual
in a significant romantic or sexual relationship does not, by itself, satisfy the family-or-house-
hold-member requirement of the Domestic Abuse Act. The district court must consider the four
statutory factors .... ).
73 See State v. Potts, 135 P3 d 1054, 1056 (Kan. zoo6); Judson v. Weiss, No. COAI2- 403 , 2013 WL
599956, at *I (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2o3) (finding that petitioner and defendant moved in together
after beginning a romantic relationship).
74 See Scott v. Shay, 928 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that a past sexual assault
does not, by itself, establish a romantic or intimate relationship for purposes of seeking a protective
order). In Minnesota, whether a romantic relationship exists is not conditioned upon when it oc-
curred. See Sperle, 763 N.W2d at 675 ("[A] former relationship may qualify as a significant romantic
or sexual relationship under the Domestic Abuse Act.").
75 Sperle, 763 N.W2d at 675.
76 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1511 ( 4 th ed. 2000).
77 See Largio, supra note 52, at 967, 975.
78 Id. at 962-64.
79 ARIz. Rtv. STAT. ANN. § 13-36o(A)(6) (Supp. 2012); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6210 (West 2004);
HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-1 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5x8B.os, subdiV. 2(b) (West Supp. 2012);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-323(7) (2008); NEv. REv. STAT. § 33.018(2) (20II); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN §
r73-B:i(XV) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.705(3) (2on1); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6102(a) (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101(2) (2010).
80 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6210 (West 2004); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-323(7) (20o8), NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 33.018(2) (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705(3) (2011).
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intercourse is often an important factor in the court's determination of whether
the parties are intimate or dating. However, no state has explicitly defined what
a "sexual relationship" actually entails." The common understanding of the term
is no help either-interpretations of whether a relationship is sexual vary from
person to person.82
When state statutes define dating relationships in terms of sex, problems
arise. First, such attention to sexual relationships fails to cover the broad range
of relationships subject to domestic violence." Not all violent relationships have
a sexual component and thus, some victims who need protection are unable to
obtain it from the court because of a technicality." Second, the term "sexual
relationship" is ambiguous. This makes it difficult for courts to apply the term
with uniformity and has the potential to lead to arbitrary decisions.15
4. Not Casual.-Many states define dating relationships in the negative,
explaining what a dating relationship is not, rather than attempting to describe
all it can be. These state statutes most often use a variation of this phrasing:
"[a dating relationship] does not include a casual acquaintanceship or ordinary
fraternization." 6 As with other terms, "casual relationship" and "ordinary
fraternization" are not explicitly defined, leaving courts to substitute their own
interpretations. In an Illinois case, a casual relationship was found to relate to
the frequency of the party's interaction-a single date is a casual relationship
and thus does not qualify as a dating relationship." In addition, the court found
that as the exclusivity in the relationship increases, so does the likelihood of the
relationship being a "dating relationship,"" similar to how increasing "intimate"
or "romantic" involvement indicates the same.89
81 See Beth Goldstein Lewis Trimmer, Comment, A Sexual Relationship, Did We Have One?
A Review ofthe Definition of "Sexual Relationship' Within the Context ofAlaska's Domestic Violence
Laws, 24 ALSKA L. REV. 237, 243-44 (2007).
82 Id. at 243.
83 See Largio, supra note 52, at 964.
84 See id. at 969.
85 See Trimmer, supra note 81, at 248-51.
86 HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (West 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(2) (2009); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (Supp. 2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(6) (West Supp. 2013); MIcH.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 764.15a(b) (West Supp. 2013); MIss. CODE. ANN. § 93-21- 3 (d) (West Supp.
2012); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-323(7) (2008); NEv. REv. STAT. § 33.OI8(2) (2011); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW
§ 4 59- a(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5oB-i (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 6o.x(5) (West Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3 6- 3-601(5)(C) (20o0); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
71.0021(c) (West Supp. 2012); W VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-204(4) (LexisNexis 2009); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 83.12(i)(ag) (West Supp. 2012).
87 See Alison C. v. Westcott, 798 N.E.zd 813, 816-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
88 Id at 87.
89 People v. Young, 840 N.E.2d 825, 831-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that the relationship
was more like a companionship rather than involving romantic feelings and thus not a dating rela-
tionship for purposes of domestic violence law).
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5. List ofFactors.-A number of states provide a list of factors to guide the court
in its determination as to whether a dating relationship exists.o Every state
using this method includes length, frequency of interaction between petitioner
and defendant, and type or nature of the relationship as factors indicating the
existence of a dating relationship.9' Type and nature have been explained in
some states as "either party's expectation of sexual or romantic involvement," 92
but in other states these terms are specifically unrelated to the existence of
a sexual relationship.3 Some states also ask whether the relationship has
terminated, 94 or how long it has been since the relationship was terminated."
In most states, the factors listed are not exclusive, and the courts are free to
consider additional relevant facts."
Largio argues that using factors to describe a "dating relationship" is ideal
"because it is more flexible and permissive, allowing greater consideration of
relational aspects and greater examination of the situation surrounding the
relationship."97 For example, in a state that employs a non-exclusive list of
factors for the court to consider, a petitioner is not immediately disqualified
go ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § i3 - 3 6oi(A)(6) (Supp. 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(2)
(2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1o, § 1041 (Supp. 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(2) (2011); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 236.2(2)(e)(I) (West Supp. 2013) (referring to 'duration' rather than length); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 2x-5mii(i)(i) (West 2012); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 4 6:215 i(B) (2010); MASs. ANN. LAWS
ch. 209A, § I (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5x8B.oi, subdiv. 2(b) (West Supp. 2012); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 9 3-21- 3(d) (West Supp. 202); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 459-a(2)(f) (McKinney Supp.
2013) (referring to "intimate" relationship rather than "dating" relationship); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
5oB-i (2011) (referring to a relationship "over time"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-2 9 -2(b) (Supp. 2011);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7 1.002(b) (West Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2010);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010(3) (2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.x2(I)(ag) (West Supp. 2012).
95 See supra note 9o.
92 IOWA CODE ANN. § 23 6.2(2)(e)(i)(d) (West Supp. 203). Additionally, Largio advocates for
interpreting "nature of the relationship" language more broadly than has been interpreted by cur-
rent state law, '[t]he nature of the relationship includes the activities in which the parties partake,
how the parties interact with one another, and any other circumstances surrounding the type of
relationship itself." Largio, supra note 52, at 977.
93 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 4 59-a(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 2013); see also Pablo v. Crowder, 236
S.W 3 d 55 9 ,563 (Ark. Ct. App. 2oo6) (interpreting "type"of relationship based on it lasting "a couple
of months," described by victim has "serious," rather than the sexual nature of the relationship).
94 ARMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § i3- 3 6o(A)(6)(d) (Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(2)(e)(I)
(c) (West Supp. 2013)-
95 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13- 3 6oi(A)(6)(d) (Supp. 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(2)
(d) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5r1u(i)(I) (West 2012); MAsS. ANN. LAws ch. 2o9A, § I (LexisNexis
2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.oi, subdiv. 2(b) (West Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. S, § noI(2)
(2010).
96 See Largio, supra note 52, at 964-67. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(2) (2oo9) (em-
phasis added) ("'Dating relationship' means a romantic or intimate social relationship between two
(2) individuals that shall be determined by examining the following factors . . . ."), With IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.2(2)(e)(i) (West Supp. 2013) ("[T]he court may consider the following nonexclusive list
of factors . . . .").
97 Largio, supra note 52, at 967.
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from seeking protection when her relationship does not meet one of the listed
factors.
Another strength of the factor approach rests in its ability to stand up against
constitutional arguments of vagueness. Appellants have challenged the Texas
definition of "dating relationship" on several occasions, arguing that the term
is vague and thus, that the statute is unconstitutional. 98 Yet the factor approach
employed by the Texas statute was upheld as sufficiently straightforward.99 One
Texas appeals court stated, "[t]he statute's definition of 'dating relationship' is
defined by commonly used terms; the definition is not complicated. It takes a
common-sense approach to describing a dating relationship."10o
6. No Definition.-A large number of states decline to describe the relationship
altogether by simply providing protection for those in a dating relationship.10'
Interestingly, Hawaii's and Oklahoma's statutes use the term "courtship" rather
than "dating."102 With no qualifying language, these statutes grant courts broad
discretion to determine who is, and who is not, in a dating relationship. Notably,
courts often respond to this breadth of discretion by either referring to other
states with factor approaches or creating their own factors. For example, New
Jersey courts have adopted a six-question test that asks whether the relationship
was casual, how frequent the interactions were, and whether the relationship
was public."0 3 Other states with broadly defined statutes rely on guidance from
laws outside their own state to construct their own definitions. For example,
after an analysis of other states' statutes, Alaska's courts have defined a dating
relationship as "a relationship that either is marked by emotional intimacy or
whose purpose is to allow two people to evaluate each other's suitability as a
partner in an intimate relationship or in marriage."104
98 Childress v. State, 285 S.W.3d 544, 551-52 (Tex. App. 2009); see also Ochoa v. State, 355
S.W3 d 48,55 (Tex. App. 2010).
99 Childress, 285 S.W.3d at 551-52.
100 Id. at 552.
101 ALA. CODE § i3A-6-I 3o(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.66-990(4), (5)(C)
(202); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4 6b- 38a(2)(F) (West Supp. 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-
44.8(a)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); ME. REv. STAT. ANN, tit. 19 -A, § 4 002(3-A) (Supp. 2012); Nj.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-1 9 (d) (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(4) (2009); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 35-2I-bo2(a)(iv)(H) (2on1).
102 HAw. REv. STAT. § 586-1 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 6o.i(5) (West Supp.
2013).
103 The six-question test asks: (i) Was there a minimal social interpersonal bonding of the
parties over and above a mere casual fraternization? (2) How long did the alleged dating activities
continue prior to the acts of domestic violence alleged? (3) What were the nature and frequency
of the parties' interactions? (4) What were the parties' ongoing expectations with respect to the
relationship, either individually or jointly? (5) Did the parties demonstrate an affirmation of their
relationship before others by statement or conduct? (6) Are there any other reasons unique to the
case that support or detract from a finding that a "dating relationship" exists? S.K. v. J.H., 43 A.3 d
1248,1250 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
104 Bates v. State, 258 R3d 851, 862 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
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7. Strategies Combined.-While some states employ only the factor list or
simply describe a relationship as an "intimate" one, most states combine the
above terms and strategies in different ways. These combinations result in a
broad spectrum of protection by allowing courts more or less flexibility in their
determination of who may ask for protection.
Some approaches are better than others. The factor approach provides
guidance to courts in what should be considered a dating relationship, but it isn't
exclusive. Because of this increased flexibility, a court can make determinations
on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, those statutes that "describe[] what
the relationship entails, either by stating what a dating relationship is, what it is
not, or both,""os have been criticized as less helpful than the factor approach.'"
These are statutes that refer to dating relationships with terms like intimate,
romantic, sexual, or not casual. 'The problem with this approach is that it creates
situations in which a victim who needs a protective order cannot obtain one
because of a court's particular interpretation of the words in the statute. 0 To
illustrate this problem, Largio describes a long-term relationship between two
people who care about each other and see each other frequently but who have
not had sex, are not necessarily romantic nor have future plans of engagement or
marriage.'os If this relationship becomes abusive, it would seem that the victim
should be able to protect herself. But since the relationship isn't "intimate" or
"romantic" and could even be viewed as "casual," she could be disqualified.o10
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT DOMESTIc VIOLENCE LAW
A. Historical Foundations for Today's Domestic Violence Laws
The extensive protections available to victims of domestic violence under
the law are an exciting example of how social activism leads to positive change.
For most of American history, the mainstream political and legal community
ignored violence in the home. The prevailing opinion in American culture
was that marriage was a private matter-affairs within the home should be
dealt with in the home, not by any outside legal framework.1 o The influence
of patriarchy on those who made and interpreted the laws can also explain
this reluctance to address domestic violence. Whether consciously or not,
men in charge maintained male power and control by either ignoring or
105 Largio, supra note 52, at 962.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 964; see also Trimmer, supra note 8S, at 248-51 (using vague terms such as "sexual
relationship" that are often left undefined in state statutes, opens up the possibility that a victim
intended to be protected by legislature will be denied help due to subjective judicial interpretation).
io8 Largio, supra note 52, at 964.
1o Id. at 964.
no KAREL KURST-SWANGER & JACQUELINE L. PETCOSKY, VIOLENCE IN THE HOME: MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 27 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
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perpetuating violence against children and women."' It was not until the
women's movement of the 1970s challenged the status quo that the law began
to recognize and protect against domestic abuse." 2 These second wave feminists
argued violence in the home was "both a symptom of patriarchal values and a
tool of maintaining gender dominance, in which the state was complicit for
its failure to intervene.""' After several unsuccessful attempts, proponents of
domestic violence protections began to chip away at the legal framework that
had protected abusers in the past. The 1980s saw changes to almost all state
laws and the first federal recognition of domestic violence under the Reagan
administration. 114
But domestic violence laws often protected married women only.1 s As
previously noted, the first version of the domestic violence legislation in
Kentucky allowed only members of "married couples" to petition the court for
an emergency protective order.n6 In her article Marriage Mimicry: The Law of
Domestic Violence, Professor Ruth Colker notes that critics viewed these new
laws as "an unacceptable federal intrusion into the domestic realm" and "an
attack on the American family.""' Thus, Colker concludes, limiting protection
to married women was a type of compromise. Although radically stepping into
the domestic sphere, these laws were not so brazen as to go even further by
protecting people living outside the bounds of traditional marriage."
B. Focus on Marriage or Marriage-Like Relationships
Even though protections for victims have been expanded outside of
marriage, domestic violence law remains constructed around the idea of
marriage-like relationships.' This is evident in most of the laws in existence
today. Kentucky's law no longer requires marriage in order to seek protection,
but it does require relationships that look like marriage: couples who live
together or share a child.120
n Id. at 28.
112 See Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law ofDomestic Violence, 47 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
1841, 1851 (2oo6).
113 Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741,754 (2007).
114 See Colker, supra note u12, at 1853-55.
n5 Id. at 1856.
u16 Act of Mar. 28,1984, ch. 152, sec. 2, 1984 Ky. Acts 389,389 (providing for protections of mar-
ried couples or "any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree").
117 Colker, supra note u1, at 1856 n.62 (quoting Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of
Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 983, 999 (1989)).
n18 Id. at 1856.
119 See id at 1856-57.
12o Act of Apr. 9, 1988, ch. 258, sec. 4, 1988 Ky. Acts 633, 635 (amending the statute to include
a "former spouse"or an "unmarried couple which has a child in common"); Act of Apr. 1, 1992, ch.
172, sec. 2, 1992 Ky. Acts 443,444 (amending the statute to protect the "member of an unmarried
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However, victims who are married to or live with their abuser are not
the only ones at risk. Violence in dating relationships is a well-documented
phenomenon.'21 A national study on dating violence reported that approximately
one-third of women had experienced physical dating violence by their fourth
year of college.122 As a result, most states have included members of dating
relationships in their definitions of who may be protected under the state
domestic violence law.123
Allowing members of "dating" couples to petition the court for protection
serves an immediate purpose, but it doesn't get to the root of the problem. Even
laws extending protection to members of dating relationships most often require
the petitioner to be involved in a relationship that still looks a lot like a traditional
marriage. 124 Many states require that the relationship have a sexual or romantic
component.125 The factor approach emphasizes long-term, monogamous, close
relationships as those that qualify as dating relationships. The problem with
what Colker calls this "marriage-mimicry model" is that state legislatures that
constructed laws on this model failed to ask the most important questions:
"who is most in need of legal recourse and how the law can best provide that
recourse?"126 Women have reported violence long after their dating relationship
ended or violence perpetuated by a "friend or acquaintance."'27 Colker argues
that domestic violence law should not be concerned with the status of a victim's
couple,"defined as "each member of an unmarried couple which allegedly has a child in common,
any children of that couple, or a member of an unmarried couple who are living together or have
formerly lived together").
121 SeeJudith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage:A Callfor
Reform, 23 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 93,94 (2005).
122 The average age of female participants in the study was 2I. Paige Hall Smith,Jacquelyn W.
White & Lindsay J. Holland, A Longitudinal Perspective on Dating Violence Among Adolescent and
College-Age Women, 93 Am.J. PUB. HEALTH IO4, Ilo4-06 (2003) (reporting that by their fourth year
of college 77.8% of women had experienced violence from a "romantic partner," usually identified as
a boyfriend); see alsojonathan Neufeld,John R.McNamara &Melissa Ertl, Incidence andPrevalence
of Dating Partner Abuse and Its Relationship to Dating Practices, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
125,128-30 (1999) (reporting 90% of female undergraduates, average age A8, reported some form of
psychological abuse and 40% reported physical abuse).
123 See discussion supra Part I.B.
124 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/ro3(6) (West Supp. 2013) (allowing petitioners in a "dat-
ing or engagement relationship" to petition the court for protection, so long as the relationship is
'neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business
or social context"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 6o.i(5) (West Supp. 2013) ("Dating relationship'
means a courtship or engagement relationship. For purposes of this act, a casual acquaintance or
ordinary fraternization between persons in a business or social context shall not constitute a dating
relationship ...
125 See discussion supra Part I.B.
126 Colker, supra note 112, at 1845.
127 Colker also points out that the research on abuse outside of marriage-like relationships
is slim, simply because research itself is still framed around the marriage-mimicry model. See id.
at 1879-80.
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relationship with her abuser.128 Instead, the law should reflect the reasons why
we protect domestic violence differently than other types of violence.129
C. The Reality ofDomestic Violence
In her article, Bringing down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance
over Form in Personalized Abuse, Orly Rachmilovitz responds to Colker by
identifying four characteristics of domestic violence that set it apart from
stranger violence.'10 These characteristics, combined with other similar theories,
provide insight into the importance of extending protection outside the realm
of marriage-like relationships.
Heightened accessibility is the first characteristic Rachmilovitz identifies as
particular to domestic violence. When an abuser is familiar with his victim, her
schedule, and habits, the victim is more vulnerable to abuse.' Scholars in this
area have also used power theory to explain the occurrence of domestic violence.
This theory encompasses Rachmilovitz's second and third characteristics of
domestic violence: power imbalance.' Power theory identifies patterns in
abusive relationships of the "stronger" partner abusing the "weaker" partner.133
Societal gender norms can be the basis for this power, as often it is men who
abuse women.134 Power can also be economic, based on which partner has
access to certain resources.3 s Rachmilovitz relates power to control, arguing
that abuse results from one partner's desire to maintain power or control over
the other or as a response to perceived powerlessness. 3 6 Power dynamics are
related to dependence in a relationship, which Rachmilovitz identifies as her
fourth characteristic of domestic violence. Emotional dependence (created by a
history of shared experience), financial dependence, or social dependence (when
a victim's only social support system is her abuser) can create an environment
where one partner is more powerful and create an opportunity for abuse. 3
Other theories attempt to explain why domestic violence occurs by looking
at human interaction on a slightly broader scale. For example, stress theory
argues that economic, social, or personal stressors, including substance abuse,
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1881-82.
130 See Rachmilovitz, supra note 52, at 500-07.
131 See id. at 500-01.
132 Rachmilovitz cites as her second characteristic "violation of trust" and points out that
an abusive partner manipulates his victim's trust to facilitate the abuse. Ihis trust power-struggle
seems particularly related to Rachmilovitz's third characteristic about power imbalances and thus, I
have combined the two for the purposes of this summary. See id. at 502-05.
133 KURST-SWANGER & PETCOSKY, supa note io, at 39.
134 Rachmilovitz, supra note 52, at 503-05.
135 See KURST-SWANGER & PETCOSKY, supra note io, at 39.
136 Rachmilovitz, supra note 52, at 503-05-
137 Id. at 505-07.
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often lead to "family violence."1 3 s Social learning theory argues that violence
occurs because abusers learn to abuse in childhood, either as victims of abuse
themselves or as witnesses to intimate abuse. Abusers then repeat this learned
behavior into adulthood. 139
Domestic violence happens for a number of reasons.'Ihe nature of the abuse
is also complex. What is fairly straightforward is that domestic violence does
not occur just because two people are married, share a child, or live together.
Instead, violent relationships are typically those that are characterized by
heightened accessibility, the opportunity for power imbalances, or dependence.
The data clearly show that violence can occur outside the traditional marriage,
and it is plausible that other types of relationships can also lead to violence.
Rachmilovitz argues that even friends and roommates, while not romantic,
share all of the same key characteristics as marital relationships.1' Roommates
have heightened accessibility to each other and relationships can include
imbalances of power and dependence, most likely related to money or strong
emotional connections. Therefore, abuse in this type of relationship can be just
as dangerous and just as crippling as abuse in "intimate" relationships. 141
Acknowledging that the law must not be overbroad but should encompass
all victims of abuse, Rachmilovitz' solution is basic-focus on substance
rather than form. She argues that rather than defining victims based on
their relationship, the determination of whether they are victims qualified to
seek protection under the law should be based on what is happening in their
relationships and whether it rises to the level of "personalized abuse."142
III. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Kentucky's current law does not reflect the reality of domestic violence.
This section will propose two amendments that could more adequately protect
victims: amend Kentucky law to include members of dating relationships and
amend Kentucky law to protect all victims of domestic violence. The issue has
faced significant opposition in Kentucky's legislature, so this section will also
respond to critiques of those who oppose changing the law.
A. Amend Kentucky Law to Include Members ofDating Relationships
At the very least, Kentucky's legislature should change the law to include
and define members of dating relationships among those who may petition the
court for protection. Kentucky's last three legislative sessions have addressed
this issue. In 2011,2012, and 2013, the proposals to amend the law failed in the
138 KuRST-SWANGER & PETCOSKY, Supra note IIo, at 38-39.
139 Id. at 43-44.
140 Rachmilovitz, supra note 52, at 532.
141 See id. at 532-33.
142 Id at 536-37.
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Senate Judiciary Committee.143 In 2014, the fourth proposal was introduced in
the House."
Under current Kentucky law, "members of an unmarried couple" may
petition the court for an EPO or DVO. The 2014 proposal amends the current
definition of "member of an unmarried couple" to include "persons who are or
have been in a dating relationship." 145 As proposed, dating relationship means:
[A] relationship between individuals who have or have had a relationship
of a romantic or intimate nature. The following factors may be considered
in determining whether the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent is currently or was previously a romantic or sexual relationship:
(a) The nature of the relations hip was characterized by the expectation of
affection between the parties; (b) The frequency and type of interaction
between the persons involved in the relationship included the fact that
the persons have been involved over time and on a continuous basis
during the course of the relationship; (c) The relationshi existed within
the past three years; and (d) The term does not include violence in a casual
acquaintanceship or violence between individuals who only have engaged in
ordinary fraternization in a business or social context.1 6
This proposal combines a number of strategies used by other states. It
employs the factor approach, providing a non-exclusive list of factors that can
guide the court in its determination of whether the petitioner is in a "dating
relationship." One of the biggest advantages to this approach is that it can
be broad enough to allow the court to be flexible and base its decisions upon
individual circumstances, but detailed enough to provide a court with guidance
in its determination.
However, as read, the definition appears to require that a relationship be
"romantic" or "intimate." The definition then goes on to say that the factors
143 The 20s and 2012 proposals defined "dating relationship" as
a relationship between individuals, each of whom is eighteen (18) years of age or older,
who have or have had a relationship of a romantic or intimate nature, but does not
include a casual acquaintanceship or ordin fraternization in a business or social con-
text. The existence of a dating relationship shall be determined based on consideration
of the length and nature of t e relationship and the frequency and type of interaction
between the persons involved in the relationship.
H.B. 498, 2012 Gen. Assemb., 12th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2012), available at http://www.1rc.ky.gov/
record/12rs/HB 4 9 8.htm; H.B. 35, 2011 Gen. Assemb., iith Reg. Sess. (Ky. 20x), available at http://
www.lrc.ky.gov/record/iirs/HB35.htm. See also H.B. 9, 2013 Gen. Assemb., x3th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2013),
available at http://www.1rc.ky.gov/record/I3rs/HB9.htm.
144 See H.B. 8, 2014 Gen. Assemb., 14 th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2014), available at http://www.lrc.
ky.gov/record/14 RS/HB8.htm. Although less popular in the past, the bill was introduced with
twenty-four sponsors, both Republication and Democrat. For this reason, and because of new
leadership in the Senate Judiciary Committee (freshman Republican Senator Whitney Westerfield
replaced Sen. Tom Jensen as chair in late 202), it seems is likely that such an amendment will be
added to Kentucky's books in the near future. In that event, this Note is timely because it analyzes
the proposed language for courts interpreting it, and it argues that the amendment is still not
enough to provide victims with the protection they need.





are to aid in the determination of whether the relationship is "romantic" or
"sexual." 147 This wording presents several problems. The definition appears to
use "intimate" and "sexual" interchangeably. If this is the case, it would follow
that in order for a petitioner to qualify for protection, she must either be in a
romantic relationship or a sexual relationship. This in turn raises questions as
to what, exactly, is meant by "romantic" and "sexual," or the phrase "expectation
of affection" found in the factor list. Interpretations of these terms can vary,
and other state's courts have not established explicit meanings that would be
helpfd.148 Since the statute appears to require the existence of romance or sex,
rather than balancing these aspects of the relationship along with other factors,
the ambiguity of these terms is problematic. This could lead to a situation in
which a victim cannot seek protection merely because her relationship fails to
meet whatever definition that particular court applies to these terms.
B. Amend Kentucky Law to Protect All Victims ofDomestic Violence
By including dating relationships under Kentucky's domestic violence
protection statute, state representatives would help victims who really need it.
But like domestic violence laws across the country, Kentucky's law is still based
on a model that focuses on marriage or marriage-like relationships. This focus
is largely political rather than realistic. 149 Violence can occur in many different
types of relationships, whether they are romantic, intimate, marriage-like, or
not. Therefore, I suggest adding a provision that would provide members of
non-romantic relationships the option to seek protection.
Currently, a "family member" or "member of an unmarried couple" may
petition the court for protection in Kentucky.so I propose adding to this
list: "any other person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing person as
determined by the court.""' This additional "sufficient relationship" category
should be determined based on a non-exclusive list of factors. While the factor
approach is similar in form to those factors used in the 2014 proposal to describe
a dating relationship, the factors themselves should change to reflect the reality
of domestic violence. Thus, the factors should require the court to consider
the potential in the relationship for dependency, heightened accessibility, and
the existence of power imbalances that Rachmilovitz describes 15 2 as common
characteristics of violent relationships."s3
147 Id.
148 See discussion supra Part I.B.
149 See discussion supra Part II.
150 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.725(l) (West 2006).
151 If adopted, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403-725(I) would be amended to read: "any family mem-
ber, member of an unmarried couple, or any other person with a sufficient relationship to the abus-
ing person as determined by the court who is a resident."
152 See Rachmilovitz, supra note 52, at 500-07
153 Thus, an additional section of Ky REv. STAT. ANN § 403.725 would read as follows:
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This proposal is modeled after North Dakota's domestic violence law that
includes in its definition of petitioners "any other person with a sufficient
relationship to the abusing person as determined by the court."15 4 While
North Dakota's provision successfully steers clear of requiring marriage-like
relationships, it also provides little in terms of definitiveness and guidance.
However, by using factors to guide the court in what is meant by a "sufficient
relationship," Kentucky's legislature can provide courts with more direction to
make their determination without losing the flexibility of the language.
C. Response to Criticism
The recent debate in Kentucky surrounding the addition of dating
relationships to the domestic violence statute has sparked several critiques from
those in favor of maintaining the current law. The following sections respond to
these critiques both in the context of the dating relationship amendment and
as related to the provision broadening the law to include other relationships the
court deems appropriate.
1. Protection Under Criminal Law.--Critics dispute the necessity of any
change to the law given the alternative options available for protection under
Kentucky's criminal justice system.'s There are several problems with this
argument. First, the criminal assault and stalking laws in Kentucky do not
provide the comprehensive protections that are available under the civil system.
The most significant difference between the criminal and civil system is the
ease and immediacy with which a petitioner may ask the court for protection.
Courts granting an EPO offer twenty-four hour access and free filing to a
victim.s 6 When a court issues an EPO, it is immediately entered into the LINK
system, accessible from every police cruiser in the state. By contrast, criminal
restraining orders are only available after a defendant is convicted of stalking,'s
"Sufficient relationsh may be determined based on the following factors: (a) the
length of the relationshp,(b)the frequency of interaction between the persons involved
in the relationship, (c) how the parties interact with one another, (d) heightened
accessibility of one or both parties to the other; (e) whether and the existence of or
potential for dependence within the relationship. These factors shall not be exclusive
and other considerations may be taken into account.
Id. See generally Largio, supra note 52, at 977 (advocating that "nature of the relationship" language
should be more broad to include "how the parties interact with one another").
154 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.-o(4) (2009).
155 Sen. Tom Jensen, a London Republican who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee during the zon and 2012 session, expressed the hesitancy of Senators to consider the bill.
"We don't have a lot of people in the Senate who think it's even necessary," Jensen said, adding
that some senators believe existing criminal laws against assault, stalking, or other offenses are
adequate in such cases. Deborah Yetter, Bill to Extend Domestic Violence Protection Advances, Cou-
RIER-J. (Louisville) (Mar. 14, 2012, 9:24 PM), http://www.courier-joumal.com/article/20120314.
NEWSor/303x4oo94.
156 See supra Part I.A.2.
157 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.155 (West 2oo6).
547
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
and conditional release orders are only available after a party has been arrested
for an assault or sexual offense."" 'Ihus, under the criminal code, the best-case
scenario following abuse is that the victim is able to alert the police; they
respond quickly and arrest her abuser; then she applies for a restraining order.
Even in this best-case scenario the victim is dependent on the efficiency and
immediacy of the police force and has no way to take preventative measures
before involving the criminal justice system.
Additionally, the criminal system cannot offer a tailored approach to
protection. Under the civil system, ajudge (after reading the victim's petition or
hearing her testimony) has complete discretion to include any orders in an EPO
or DVO that relate to the victim's particular needs or circumstances. On the
other hand, a judge issues a criminal restraining order (the quickest restraining
order available under the criminal system) at a pretrial release hearing. The
judge hears the report of the pretrial release officer, who has interviewed the
defendant, but is not required to speak to the victim. Although the judge has
discretion to include any "other" provisions necessary, this decision does not
necessarily involve the victim and therefore, cannot be adequately tailored to
fit her needs.
Furthermore, criminal restraining orders do not offer a permanent solution.
The conditional release order, arguably the best criminal option for emergency
protection, lasts only until trial. 'Ihe other available criminal restraining order,
available only for defendants convicted of stalking, has a ten-year limit.159
Second, the inequalities inherent in the criminal justice system make it the
least impressive solution to problems of domestic violence. Those punished
under criminal domestic violence laws are disproportionately minority men.16o
Critics of the criminal justice system argue that this disproportion reflects the
prevailing racism and classism ingrained in society's institutions and point
out that often abusers are victims of inequality themselves.161 Also, given
the unhappy history between law enforcement and minority or low-income
communities and many other pressures, minority and low-income women are
often wary of turning to the criminal justice system for help. 162 Moreover, many
women who may depend on their abuser economically do not necessarily want
him to have a criminal record, which would make it harder to find a job.16 1
There is value in punishing those who hurt innocent victims. But pro-
punishment rationales steer the domestic violence issue away from its feminist
158 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.o64(l) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). Although a court may also
issue a summons, therefore simply requiring the defendant to appear before the judge and not to
jail, it is unlikely that a mere summons would issue in domestic violence situations, where impend-
ing violence is often likely.
159 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.155(5) (West 2006).
160 Gruber, supra note 113, at 805.
161 Id. at 751 n.45.
162 Id. at 758 n.8o.
163 See id. at 805 n.271.
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roots that focused more on the autonomy of women. "Reformers have
abandoned the basic premise that the well-being and equality of women is the
basis for policy reform and instead espouse the view that reform is defensible
on the garden-variety ground that 'criminal prosecution vindicates society's
injuries.'t
2. Indefiniteness.--Critics also argue that the proposed definition of what
constitutes a dating relationship is too vague or indefinite to be applied
uniformly across the state. 6 s However, approaches that employ factor lists have
passed muster against challenges of vagueness.166 There is no evidence that
any statute using a similar factor approach has caused confusion among the
judiciary or has been applied in a manner that is inconsistent across the state.
Most importantly, state legislatures simply cannot foresee how and to whom
domestic violence will occur. The civil law allows for flexibility in order to offer
the most comprehensive protection for victims of domestic violence.
3. Potential for Abuse of the Protection Order System.-The restrictive language
in the domestic violence statute establishes a threshold limit on who may ask
the court for protection. Thus, theoretically, it prevents those who would use
the court system for dishonest or unnecessary reasons from filing a petition
in the first place. Without limiting language, anyone can petition the court
for protection, whether or not they are actually victims of domestic violence.
Opponents argue that, in turn, this increases the load on an already over-
burdened court system.1 7
However, it is important to remember that restrictive language also has
the effect of denying those who are victims of violence protection based on
technicalities. This was the case for Jeri Stewart.' 8 Domestic violence is a
164 Id. at 811-12 (internal footnote omitted).
165 Opponents point out that dating could be construed as a couple who has gone on one
date or a couple that has gone on ten dates. Interview by Bill Goodman with Senator Tom Jen-
sen, Chair, Ky. Senate Comm., Bills Relating to Domestic Violence, KET's Kentucky Tonight, Feb.
22, 2010, available at http://www.ket.org/cgi-bin/cheetah/watch-video.pl?nola=KKYTO+ooI
7 I3 .
Also, critics argue that the definition should be precise, given the huge cost impact on a party who
is subject to a protective order. Interview by Bill Goodman with Ernie Lewis, Ky. Ass'n of Criminal
Def. Lawyers, Bills Relating to Domestic Violence, KET's Kentucky Tonight, Feb. 22, 20m0, available
at http://www.ket.org/cgi-bin/cheetah/watch video.pl?nola=KKYTO+ooI 7i 3.
166 See Childress v. State, 285 S.W.3 d 544, 551-52 (Tex. App. 2009); see also Ochoa v. State, 355
S.W 3 d 48,55 (Tex. App. 2010).
167 Linda B. Blackford & Valerie Honeycutt Spears, Advocates Push for Protections against
Dating Violence in Kentucky, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jan. I, 2012, available at http://www.
kentucky.com/2012/oI/oI/20II93o/advocates-push-for-protections.html.
168 Randall v. Stewart, 223 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (PaisleyJ. noting that "while we
lack the authority to expand the scope of KRS 403.725 to cover dating relationships, this case illus-
trates the compelling need for the General Assembly to consider such an expansion"); see also Ali-
son C. v. Westcott, 798 N.E.2d 813,817 (111. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that "dating relationship"did not
apply to high school student who petitioned for order of protection from classmate she saw every
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crippling problem and a burdened court system is no rationale for denying
victims the protections they need. Besides, there are remedies already in place
to prevent abuse of the system. At the initial EPO or DVO hearing, the judge
reviews all of the facts and the testimony of the alleged victim and alleged
abuser. The judge will issue an EPO only after finding an "immediate and
present danger of domestic violence and abuse" 6' or, in the case of a DVO,
only after finding "from a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of
domestic violence and abuse have occurred and may again occur. "170 There is no
one size fits all scenario when it comes to incidents of domestic violence. As
such, the judge is in the best position, after reviewing all the evidence, to siphon
out those who do not need protection from those that do.
Furthermore, the civil EPO and DVO provide preventative measures that
can stop problems before they escalate to arrest, criminal proceedings, and
prison. Thus, broadening the net of who can seek these preventative measures
would only serve to decrease the burden on Kentucky's criminal system. 171
CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the protections available to victims of domestic
violence through Kentucky's civil law. Like many states across the country,
these protections are extensive and beneficial. However, these protections
are only available in Kentucky to parties who are married, live together, or
have a child together. This Note has shown that although forty-one states
extend protection to members of dating relationships, even these statutes
are problematic. By defining dating relationships with terms like intimate,
romantic, or sexual, state statutes lack specificity and clarity, and are thus
subject to uneven interpretation by courts. By examining domestic violence
law through a historical and theoretical lens, this Note argues that most state
definitions of "dating relationship" reflect an outdated focus on protecting
relationships that are like marriages. But domestic violence does not occur just
because two people are married or because their relationship fits the definition
of a "romantic" relationship. Rather, violence can occur in many different types
of relationships, particularly those characterized by heightened accessibility, the
opportunity for power imbalances, or dependence.
Therefore, this Note proposes that the Kentucky legislature amend its
definition of who may petition our courts for emergency protective orders or
domestic violence orders. At least, Kentucky should join the forty-one states that
day at school that violently and sexually assaulted her on a lunch break because parties only spoke
on the phone and went on the lunch date where petitioner was assaulted, they were not dating).
169 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(I) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); see also discussion supra Part
I.A.
170 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403-750() (West 2oo6 & Supp. 2012).
171 See also Smith, supra note I2I, at 146-47 (similarly arguing that New York proposals should
not fail because of the burden on courts).
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include members of "dating relationships" within the class of victims allowed
to ask the court for protection. Even better, Kentucky's state representatives
should enact legislation that would define a petitioner's eligibility for protection
based on the substance of her relationship, rather than whether it conforms to
outdated concepts of "romantic" relationships.

